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Abstract. Titman (1984) is the first to argue that non-financial stakeholders (customers, suppliers 
and employees) pass on their expected liquidation costs to the firm.  In his framework, firms can 
influence the probability of liquidation by choosing an appropriate capital structure.  Other studies 
have reasoned that the bargaining power of non-financial stakeholders (NFS) may also impact on 
financing decisions.  This paper investigates these ideas in a sample of first-time business start-ups, 
where ex-ante failure risk is high and NFS have to make relationship-specific investments.  We find 
that the size of NFS liquidation costs significantly reduces leverage and the proportion of bank 
loans.  These effects are strengthened when suppliers have strong bargaining power.  Finally, start-
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1.  Introduction 
This paper examines empirically how the relationships between a firm and its various non-financial 
stakeholders (NFS) influence capital structure.  While the finance literature so far has paid a great 
deal of attention to how relationships with and among financial stakeholders impact on financing 
decisions,
1 a few theoretical studies have argued that a firm’s customers, suppliers and employees 
may  have  an  effect,  too.    Titman  (1984)  is  the  first  to  show  that  leverage  controls  the  future 
liquidation decision, which in turn affects the terms of trade between a firm and its NFS.  The 
reason is that non-financial stakeholders price the probability of rupture of their explicit and implicit 
contracts with the firm.  So, NFS pass on their expected liquidation costs resulting from the loss of 
relationship-specific investments to the firm, and firms can influence the probability of liquidation 
by  limiting  their  debt  ratio.    This  idea  has  been  refined  in  subsequent  models  by  Cornell  and 
Shapiro (1987), Maksimovic and Titman (1991) and Arping and Lóránth (2006), among others. 
Besides the liquidation cost channel, the bargaining power of NFS vis-à-vis the firm may 
also  have  an  impact  on  capital  structure  decisions.    Bronars  and  Deere  (1991),  Dasgupta  and 
Sengupta (1993) and Perotti and Spier (1993) predict a positive relation between NFS bargaining 
power and firm leverage.  These authors argue that once contracts with NFS have been established, 
firms can lower the amount of surplus that NFS can extract by increasing their debt ratio.  Higher 
leverage also enlarges the threat of not undertaking investments that are necessary for firm survival.  
In contrast, Sarig (1998) shows that when the firm worries about suppliers threatening to curtail the 
supply of specialized factors of production, NFS bargaining power will negatively affect leverage, 
                                                 
1 Jensen (1986), for example, argues that free cash flow problems between a firm’s management and shareholders can 
be restrained by increasing firm leverage.  Also, agency problems between debt- and shareholders can be reduced by 
shortening debt maturity and increasing the proportion of monitored debt (e.g., Myers, 1977; Diamond, 1984).  These 
theories have been tested in numerous empirical studies, using data from different countries.  Overall, the literature 
finds that the collateral value of assets, profitability, growth opportunities, risk and firm size affect the debt ratio (e.g., 
Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Wald, 1999; Brounen et al., 2006), debt mix (e.g., Houston and James, 1996; Krishnaswami 
et al., 1999) and debt maturity (e.g., Barclay and Smith, 1995; Guedes and Opler, 1996; Johnson, 2003).   2 
both prior to and after contract negotiations with non-financial stakeholders.  The reason is that a 
lower debt ratio reduces the probability that a suspension of input supplies will lead to the firm’s 
liquidation. 
The empirical literature investigating the impact of NFS liquidation costs and bargaining 
power  on  capital  structure  is  scarce,  largely  because  of  the  difficulty  to  operationalize  these 
theoretical constructs by means of accounting data.  Titman and Wessels (1988), Opler and Titman 
(1994) and Welch (2004), for example, use selling expenses/sales and R&D/sales to proxy for the 
size of NFS liquidation costs whereas Sarig (1998) operationalizes employee bargaining power by 
means of labor expenses to operating income.  A few studies have related these concepts to the 
structure  of  input/output  markets.    For  instance,  Bronars  and  Deere  (1991)  use  industry-level 
unionization rates to capture employee bargaining power whereas Kale and Shahrur (2006) proxy 
NFS bargaining power  by concentration in customer and supplier industries, respectively.   Not 
surprisingly, this prior empirical research has yielded mixed results regarding the impact of NFS 
relationship costs on capital structure.  As an example, Titman and Wessels (1988) and Opler and 
Titman  (1994)  document  a  significantly  negative  relation  between  NFS  liquidation  costs  and 
leverage whereas Welch (2004) finds no effect.  Likewise, Sarig (1998) reports a negative relation 
between  employee bargaining power and leverage  whereas  Bronars and Deere (1991) find that 
industry-level unionization rates positively affect firm debt ratios within industries.  Nonetheless, 
survey evidence by Brounen et al. (2006) reveals that more than 30% of CFOs in France and the 
UK consider customers/suppliers worrying about bankruptcy as an important determinant of their 
debt choice.  This determinant ranks third, after financial flexibility and the volatility of earnings 
and cash flows, and precedes taxes, agency costs and information asymmetries. 
This study uses unique survey data on a sample of first-time business start-ups to examine 
the role of NFS relationship costs as a determinant of capital structure.  First-time business start-ups 
are neither the result of an incorporation of a previously self-employed activity, nor the result of a 
change in incorporation type.  Also, these firms do not arise from the split-up of another firm, nor   3 
are they new divisions of existing firms.  These firms therefore need to build up relationships with 
NFS  from  scratch.    In  establishing  these  relationships,  business  start-ups  face  some  specific 
disadvantages compared with industry incumbents.  The main reason lies in their combination of a 
high ex-ante failure risk and large information asymmetries.  It is well known that one out of two 
business  start-ups  stops  its  activities  within  the  first  five  years  (e.g.,  Berger  and  Udell,  1998; 
Huyghebaert and Van de Gucht, 2004).  Large information asymmetries between firm-insiders and 
outsiders basically result from the lack of an operating history.  Furthermore, entrepreneurs in first-
time business start-ups have not built up a reputation yet and, because they usually have a majority 
stake in their firm, have a lot of discretionary power regarding the firm’s strategy and operations.  
As a result, once their firm is heading for financial distress, entrepreneurs in highly levered firms 
are likely to engage in risk shifting, which may even accelerate the firm’s default.  Establishing 
relationships with business start-ups is thus a high-risk venture for NFS, especially when they have 
to  make  large  relationship-specific  investments.    Yet,  from  the  start-up’s  point  of  view, 
relationships with customers, suppliers and employees are crucial to ensure the firm’s profitability 
and survival.  By limiting the likelihood of liquidation upfront, the start-up firm may induce non-
financial stakeholders to make the necessary investments.  Also, when liquidation risk is limited, 
the terms of trade between the firm and its NFS are likely to be more favorable to the start-up.  
Titman (1984) argues that choosing a capital structure with limited debt is useful for this purpose. 
In addition to these characteristics (i.e., no history and reputation, a high failure risk), start-
ups are rather small, such that potential NFS may be in a better bargaining position vis-à-vis the 
firm.  As non-financial stakeholders are not locked in yet at the moment of start-up, entrepreneurs 
cannot ignore NFS bargaining power.  Indeed, NFS may try to extract rents from the start-up when 
negotiating the features of their contracting relationship.  Yet, entrepreneurs who have to decide on 
their venture’s initial capital structure are likely to worry about liquidation.  The reason is that 
entrepreneurs typically invest substantial financial and human capital in their company whereas 
their private benefits of control are sizeable (e.g., Hamilton, 2000).  Hence, consistent with Sarig   4 
(1998), we expect that entrepreneurs will limit their debt ratio to reduce the negative impact of NFS 
bargaining power on survival.  Also, they may adjust the debt composition and maturity structure to 
reduce the probability of liquidation.  This conjecture contrasts with the arguments that have been 
made for mature, listed firms.  Yet, for these firms, contracts with NFS are already in place and 
liquidation may not be a too large concern.  Besides, we conjecture that NFS bargaining power may 
also influence the pricing of NFS liquidation costs to the start-up firm and thus capital structure.  As 
an extension to the papers of Titman (1984) and others, we will thus examine whether the relation 
between NFS liquidation costs and capital structure is stronger when NFS have enough bargaining 
power  to  actually  influence  the  profitability  of  the  firm’s  products  and/or  services.    If  NFS 
bargaining power is important, we expect that business start-ups will have to bear a larger fraction 
of NFS liquidation costs, which can be offset by adjusting capital structure. 
Overall,  this  paper  extends  the  limited  empirical  evidence  on  the  role  of  non-financial 
stakeholders in four ways.  First, this study is the first to examine the impact of NFS relationship 
costs on capital structure in a context (true business start-ups) where NFS have to decide on making 
relationship-specific  investments  and  where  firms  are  highly  dependent  on  establishing  and 
nurturing these relationships.  As first-time business start-ups lack history, studying the impact of 
NFS within this sample also has the advantage that the research setting is relatively clean.  The 
initial capital structure reflects the firm’s true choice at start-up and is not yet influenced by the 
firm’s operating performance.  Indeed, mature firms that were successful in setting up valuable 
relationships with NFS are likely to accumulate higher profits and – to the extent that these are 
retained within the firm – a lower debt ratio.  Second, we improve upon prior contributions that 
largely use accounting data to construct proxy variables for the theoretical constructs of interest.
2  
More particularly, this study combines accounting data with unique and detailed survey data, which 
                                                 
2  In  their  paper,  Titman  and  Wessels  (1988)  warn  the  reader  that  the  negative  relation  between  their  uniqueness 
measure, which is based on selling expenses/sales, R&D/sales and job quit rates, and leverage may be caused by the 
relation between this variable and non-debt tax shields and the collateral value of assets.   5 
allows  us  to  differentiate  between  the  capital  structure  effects  of  customers,  suppliers  and 
employees.  The value of information that is not included in the financial statements was already 
documented by Kale and Shahrur (2006).  These authors find strong support for the capital structure 
effects  of  NFS  relationship  costs,  proxied  by  customer/supplier  concentration  ratios  and  the 
presence of joint ventures and strategic alliances.  Third, whereas Kale and Shahrur (2006) also 
examine the impact of NFS liquidation costs and bargaining power on capital structure, this paper is 
the first to test whether the influence of NFS liquidation costs is larger in situations where NFS are 
in a strong bargaining position.  Finally, in addition to leverage, we also examine other capital 
structure variables, such as the debt composition and maturity structure.  Our study thus recognizes 
explicitly that entrepreneurs may use more than one specific aspect of financial structure to deal 
with NFS relationship costs.  In the case of newly established ventures in traditional industries, 
public debt markets are not accessible due to these firms’ small scale.  Hence, the external financing 
sources at the moment of start-up typically consist of bank loans and trade credit (e.g., Berger and 
Udell, 1998; Huyghebaert and Van de Gucht, 2006).  When trade credit is rolled over continuously 
during the course of trading transactions with suppliers, it becomes a permanent source of financing 
for  companies.    Franks  and  Sussman  (2005)  find  that  compared  with  suppliers,  banks  enforce 
liquidation  rights  more  strictly  upon  default.    Furthermore,  short-term  bank  loans  have  more 
stringent debt-servicing obligations so that firms default more easily, ceteris paribus. 
Our results show that the size of NFS liquidation costs significantly affects capital structure, 
both statistically and economically.  In particular, an increase in NFS liquidation costs decreases the 
debt ratio and the proportion of bank loans in total debt.  In addition, supplier bargaining power has 
an impact on the relation between NFS liquidation costs and capital structure, as we find that the 
interaction term between NFS liquidation costs and supplier bargaining power is significantly and 
consistently negative in the leverage equation.  This result suggests that suppliers can more easily 
pass on their expected liquidation costs to the firm when they have larger bargaining power.  In 
                                                                                                                                                                  
   6 
contrast,  the  interaction  terms  between  NFS  liquidation  costs  and  the  bargaining  power  of 
customers and employees, respectively, are not significant in any of the capital structure equations.  
These results could indicate that the latter NFS are able to fully charge their expected liquidation 
costs when they enter into a contracting relationship with the start-up firm, independent of their 
bargaining  power.    Furthermore,  our  results  show  that  when  customer  and  supplier  bargaining 
power are large, start-ups reduce their reliance on bank loans, ceteris paribus.  Customer bargaining 
power also has some marginal negative impact on the debt ratio.  Overall, these findings are largely 
consistent with the model of Sarig (1998) and suggest that entrepreneurs, being concerned about 
their firm’s liquidation, reduce their vulnerability to NFS bargaining power by lowering their debt 
ratio  and  the  proportion  of  bank  loans  in  total  debt  when  making  initial  financing  decisions.  
Finally, the results show no impact of employees on initial capital structure.  Also, we find no 
significant effects of NFS relationship costs on the maturity structure of bank debt. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows.  The next section briefly discusses the 
existing  literature  on  the  role  of  NFS  liquidation  costs  and  bargaining  power,  from  which  we 
develop our hypotheses.  In Section 3, we introduce our unique sample of first-time business start-
ups, followed by a discussion of the variable measurements and methodology in Section 4.  In 
Section 5, we present and interpret our empirical findings.  Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2.  Development of Hypotheses 
Leverage, debt mix and debt maturity have been at the center of attention for both researchers and 
practitioners  for  decades.    After  Modigliani  and  Miller  (1958)  developed  their  irrelevance 
propositions, arguing that in perfect financial markets it does not matter how you slice up the cake 
as  long  as  its  size  remains  constant,  a  plethora  of  different  capital  structure  determinants  have 
emerged,  building  on  various  financial  market  imperfections.    Whereas  originally  this  search 
focused  on  taxes,  financial  stakeholder  information  and  agency  costs,  later  studies  borrowed   7 
insights from the industrial organization literature to develop new capital structure determinants.
3  
Although most of these studies have examined the use of strategic debt to influence the interactions 
between firms and their output market competitors, a small but growing number of papers focus on 
the relationship costs between  a firm and its customers, suppliers  and employees.  These non-
financial stakeholders typically have incomplete information about the firm but, unlike shareholders 
and creditors, have no direct financial stake.  Yet, NFS can influence firm value through the terms 
of trade under which they enter into contracting relationships.  This study examines two categories 
of  NFS  relationship  costs,  namely  NFS  liquidation  costs  and  the  costs  resulting  from  NFS 
bargaining  power.    We  conjecture  that  by  choosing  an  appropriate  capital  structure,  firms  can 
reduce  the  negative  impact  of  NFS  relationship  costs  on  their  value.    Our  hypotheses  are 
summarized in Table 1. 
<<Insert Table 1>> 
 
2.1.  NFS LIQUIDATION COSTS 
Although negotiated contracts with NFS are usually short-term, NFS also have implicit long-term 
claims on the firm when re-contracting with this same firm is less costly than switching to another 
firm.  As these implicit claims cannot be unbundled and sold apart from the NFS’ other business 
dealings with the firm, the risk associated with holding these claims is difficult to diversify.  In the 
event  of  the  firm’s  liquidation,  NFS  may  incur  large  losses  as  these  implicit  claims  expire 
worthlessly.  NFS liquidation costs (and costs of financial distress
4) typically rise with the amount 
                                                 
3 In their review article, Harris and Raviv (1991) even consider the research field that relates capital structure with input 
and output markets to be the most promising. 
4 We recognize that liquidation may not be a necessary condition for NFS to incur some costs.  Maksimovic and Titman 
(1991), for example, show that firms with a reputation of being a high-quality producer may reduce the quality of 
products/services to cut costs when approaching financial distress.  As with liquidation costs, rational NFS will also 
include these expected costs of financial distress in their terms of trade.   8 
of relationship-specific investments made by non-financial stakeholders.  Such investments include 
the acquisition of product-related skills by customers, investments in customer relations or supply 
chains by suppliers, and the investment in job-specific knowledge by employees. 
Like financial stakeholders, NFS value their direct and indirect claims with the firm, taking 
into  account  the  company’s  risk  profile.    Hence,  the  value  of  NFS  contracts  is  sensitive  to 
information about the firm’s financial condition, even when an actual default on debt is still remote.  
This process influences the terms of trade between the firm and its NFS.  Borenstein and Rose 
(1995), for example, find that airlines reduce ticket prices in the period before a bankruptcy filing.  
In other words, they find that NFS pass on their expected liquidation costs – e.g., resulting from the 
loss of frequent flyer advantages – to the firm through the price customers are willing to pay.  From 
the firm’s point of view, minimizing the proportion of NFS liquidation costs that are passed on 
maximizes  firm  value,  ceteris  paribus.    Theoretically,  this  can  be  achieved  by  lowering  the 
probability of liquidation, lowering NFS liquidation costs and/or lowering the extent to which these 
costs are passed on to the firm.  So far, the literature has mainly focused on using capital structure 
as a device to lower the probability of liquidation, possibly because management can decide more 
easily upon this mechanism.
5  In our empirical research design, we also follow this approach and 
test  whether  firms  adapt  their  financial  structure  to  the  size  of  NFS  liquidation  costs  so  as  to 
minimize the likelihood of liquidation (Hypothesis 1 hereafter).  Also, we examine whether NFS 
bargaining power influences the relation between NFS liquidation costs and capital structure, as 
NFS bargaining power may influence the extent to which NFS liquidation costs are passed on to the 
firm (see Hypothesis 3 in Section 2.3). 
This paper focuses on three important capital structure variables: leverage, debt mix (the 
proportion of bank loans in total debt) and bank debt maturity (long-term bank debt to total bank 
debt).  Prior empirical work on NFS liquidation costs (Titman and Wessels, 1988; Titman and 
                                                 
5 An exception is Arping and Lóránth (2006), who look at how the firm’s diversification policy can be used to lower 
NFS liquidation costs.   9 
Opler, 1994; Welch, 2004; Kale and Shahrur, 2006) has concentrated on the leverage decision.  
This is an obvious choice as the debt ratio determines when a firm’s control rights are passed on 
from shareholders to creditors and as the latter are fiercer liquidators than the firm’s owners.  Thus, 
an  increase  in  firm  leverage  increases  the  probability  of  liquidation,  ceteris  paribus.    But  the 
liquidation decision of companies that default on their debt is also influenced by the composition 
and the maturity structure of that debt (e.g., Gilson et al., 1990; Franks and Sussman, 2005).  In the 
case of business start-ups, debt largely consists of bank loans and trade credit.  As argued above, 
public bonds are not a viable financing source, given their small size. 
The literature provides several arguments why a larger proportion of bank loans compared 
with  trade  credit  increases  the  probability  of  liquidation,  ceteris  paribus.    First,  banks  include 
restrictive covenants in their debt contracts to reduce adverse selection and moral hazard problems 
after the loan is made (e.g., Kim et al., 2005).  However, this practice is also likely to increase the 
probability that funds are cut off once firms default on their bank debt.  In fact, Carey et al. (1998) 
find evidence consistent with the idea that banks wish to establish a reputation of being a fierce 
liquidator.  As start-up firms usually borrow funds from only one bank, it is difficult for these firms 
to switch to another lender when bank loans are not renewed (e.g., Rajan, 1992; Kim et al., 2003).  
The reason is that other banks will tend to interpret such a cut-off as a negative quality signal.  
Second, Berger and Udell (1998) report that over 90% of bank loans to small business borrowers 
are collateralized.  Hart (1995) and Manove et al. (2001) show that such practices induce banks to 
liquidate a distressed company prematurely following default, thereby avoiding the effort and the 
risk involved in restructuring a distressed firm.  Third, Wilner (2000) and Huyghebaert et al. (2006) 
argue that if borrowers generate a large percentage of lender profits, creditors will be more lenient 
in periods of financial distress.  Compared with suppliers, banks earn relatively small profit margins 
and their loan portfolios are spread over a larger number of customers.  As a result, banks hold only 
a limited implicit equity stake in borrowers and therefore liquidate sooner than non-bank lenders,   10 
such as suppliers.  Consistent with this idea, Franks and Sussman (2005) find that banks enforce 
liquidation rights more strictly following default by SMEs than suppliers. 
Finally, the maturity structure of the debt influences the timing of the liquidation decision as 
debt holders can refuse to roll over their loans at each maturity date (Berger and Udell, 1998).  So, 
lengthening debt maturity reduces the probability of early liquidation, ceteris paribus.  In support of 
this conjecture, Brounen et al. (2006) find that minimizing the risk of having to re-finance in bad 
times is ranked as the second-most important determinant of debt maturity structure.  Similar results 
are obtained by Bancel and Mittoo (2004) and Graham and Harvey (2001).  As a result, firms that 
face  NFS  with  large  firm-specific  investments  are  likely  to  prefer  long-term  debt  when  the 
possibility  of  re-financing  current  loans  is  not  guaranteed.    This  paper  examines  the  maturity 
structure of bank debt, as banks are fiercer liquidators compared with suppliers (supra).  Also, trade 
credit generally is very short-term financing by nature and entrepreneurs only have to decide upon 
debt maturity structure when negotiating a loan with their bank.  Examining the maturity structure 
of bank debt will also allow us to disentangle the debt maturity from the debt composition decision. 
The above discussion results in the following hypothesis for the relation between the size of 
NFS liquidation costs and capital structure: 
Hypothesis  1:    Firms  with  large  NFS  liquidation  costs  will  limit  their  probability  of 
liquidation, ceteris paribus.  Therefore, the larger NFS liquidation costs are, the lower the 
leverage and the proportion of banks loans in total debt will be and the longer the bank debt 
maturity, ceteris paribus. 
 
2.2.  NFS BARGAINING POWER 
In this section, we investigate the impact of NFS bargaining power on the capital structure variables 
discussed  above.    NFS  bargaining  power  is  hereby  defined  as  the  ability  of  non-financial 
stakeholders to appropriate a fraction of the firm’s surplus.  Factors that increase the bargaining 
power of NFS are, for example, customer size, the concentration of purchases with a few suppliers 
and union representation.  The theoretical literature has shown that capital structure can be used 
strategically  to  reduce  the  amount  of  surplus  (rents)  that  NFS  can  extract  from  the  firm,  but   11 
researchers  generally  differ  in  their  assumption  as  to  who  is  more  averse  to  liquidation:  non-
financial stakeholders or the firm itself.  As a result, they also differ in their predictions about the 
effect of NFS bargaining power on capital structure.  Furthermore, a distinction should be made 
between situations where firms try to influence contract terms ex ante through financing decisions 
and their ex-post temptation to re-balance their relative bargaining power vis-à-vis NFS through 
capital structure changes. 
Bronars and Deere (1991), Dasgupta and Sengupta (1993) and Perotti and Spier (1993) all 
assume that in comparison with NFS, the firm (its shareholders) is not largely concerned about 
liquidation.  Furthermore, they concentrate on situations where contracting relationships with NFS 
have been well established.  Bronars and Deere (1991) start from the observation that by issuing 
debt instead of equity, firms are obliged to pay out a portion of future earnings to creditors.  Hence, 
these obligations limit the surplus that a (powerful) labor union can extract without driving the firm 
into liquidation.  Similarly, Dasgupta and Sengupta (1993) claim that the relative bargaining power 
of NFS vis-à-vis the firm determines which (fixed) portion of the surplus – after interest payments – 
is paid out to NFS.  By increasing the debt ratio ex post, the size of this portion is reduced.  Their 
model predicts that, ceteris paribus, firms will increase leverage when dealing with strong NFS.  
Perotti and Spier (1993) find a similar effect on leverage, albeit for a different reason.  They show 
that ex post, a highly leveraged firm can force more concessions from its NFS by threatening not to 
undertake investments that are crucial for survival. 
In contrast to the previous contributions, Sarig (1998) considers the impact of bargaining 
power  upon  financing  decisions  before  contracting  relationships  are  well  established  (ex  ante).  
Also, Sarig assumes that the firm (its shareholders) is more averse to liquidation than are its NFS.  
Hence,  in  the  case  of  first-time  business  start-ups  that  have  to  decide  on  their  initial  capital 
structure,  we  expect  to  find  support  for  Sarig’s  (1998)  model  as  firms  still  need  to  establish 
contracts with NFS and as entrepreneurs are likely to highly value their venture’s survival.  First, 
ownership in business start-ups is typically highly concentrated in the hands of the entrepreneurs.    12 
In our sample, 64.62% of entrepreneurs own more than 50% of their firms’ shares.  Most of the 
other equity is provided by family and friends whereas only four firms received venture capital.  As 
entrepreneurs invest both (part of) their savings and human capital in their firm, their personal 
wealth is unlikely to be well diversified.  Second, and consistent with Hamilton (2000), we find that 
entrepreneurs in first-time business start-ups highly value private benefits of control.  56.28% of the 
entrepreneurs in our sample indicate that their main motivation for becoming an entrepreneur is the 
challenge of managing their own firm.  Also, 45.58% of entrepreneurs indicate that being their own 
boss is an important reason for setting up their own firm.  Purely financial reasons – i.e. earning 
more than under wage employment – are important for only 19.53% of entrepreneurs.  In sum, 
when NFS bargaining power is extensive, we expect entrepreneurs to reduce their vulnerability to 
threats by NFS by adjusting their capital structure so as to curb the likelihood of liquidation.  Sarig 
(1998) shows that by restricting their debt ratio, firms can limit their vulnerability to threats by 
suppliers of specialized factors of production to curtail input supplies.  This constraint on leverage 
reduces  the  probability  of  liquidation  when  input  supplies  are  suspended,  thereby  curbing  the 
bargaining power of NFS.  Furthermore, a lower debt ratio also increases the firm’s own portion of 
the surplus.  From our discussion on the relation between debt composition and maturity and the 
probability  of  liquidation  (supra),  we  derive  that  firms  can  also  moderate  their  vulnerability  to 
supplier threats by limiting the proportion of bank loans in total debt and by lengthening bank debt 
maturities. 
The above discussion results in the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis  2:  The  stronger  NFS  bargaining  power  is,  the  lower  the  leverage  and  the 
proportion of bank loans in total debt will be and the longer the bank debt maturity, ceteris 
paribus. 
 
2.3.  INTERACTION BETWEEN LIQUIDATION COSTS AND BARGAINING POWER 
As an extension to the first hypothesis and the theoretical models of Titman (1984) and others, we 
argue that the effect of NFS liquidation costs on capital structure will be strengthened when NFS   13 
have strong bargaining power.  Unlike agency costs between shareholders and creditors, which 
generally  affect  firm  value  euro  per  euro  through  the  price  of  debt  and  thus  should  be  fully 
incorporated into capital structure decisions (e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976), we conjecture that 
the liquidation costs of NFS will be taken into account especially when these costs can be easily 
passed on to the firm through product and input prices.  As the extent to which NFS liquidation 
costs can be charged to the firm depends – next to institutional characteristics – on the relative 
bargaining power of NFS vis-à-vis the firm, we hypothesize that firms adjust their capital structure 
to deal with NFS liquidation costs to a larger extent when NFS are in a stronger bargaining position.  
So, besides the simple term NFS liquidation costs, as mentioned in Hypothesis 1, we also expect the 
interaction term with NFS bargaining power to impact on capital structure. 
This results in the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: The impact of NFS liquidation costs on capital structure (Hypothesis 1) is 
strengthened when NFS have strong bargaining power.  So, NFS liquidation costs * NFS 
bargaining power is negatively related to leverage and the proportion of bank loans in total 
debt and positively to bank debt maturity, ceteris paribus. 
 
To conclude this hypotheses section, Equation (1) summarizes our research design: 
1 2 3 4
1
* * *( * )
L
ij i i j i j i j j li lj
l
CS a a LC a BP a LC BP b X
=
= + + + +∑                   (1) 
with:  ij CS = capital structure variable i (i=1: leverage; i=2: mix; i=3: maturity) of firm j 
j LC = proxy variable for NFS liquidation costs in firm j 
j BP  = proxy variable for NFS bargaining power in firm j 
lj X  = set of L control variables for capital structure variable i of firm j 
 
3.  Data 
The empirical capital structure literature tends to focus on listed firms, largely because data on these 
firms can be easily accessed.  However, to test the impact of NFS relationship costs on financing 
decisions, a sample of newly established entrepreneurial ventures may yield additional insights.  
Also, Cornell and Shapiro (1987) argue that firms that have not yet developed a reputation should 
pay most attention to the costs that NFS suffer upon the firm’s liquidation when making capital   14 
structure decisions.  The reason is that, because of a lack of reputation, they cannot assure non-
financial  stakeholders  that  the  firm’s  optimal  future  strategy  involves  honoring  NFS’  implicit 
claims.  Hence, capital structure can be used as an alternative bonding mechanism for these firms.  
Another interesting characteristic of business start-ups is that they face high failure risk and large 
information asymmetries, which makes it more difficult to convince NFS to make relationship-
specific investments.  Indeed, the latter are sunk costs that cannot be recuperated if the firm is 
liquidated.  Finally, compared with mature industry incumbents, business start-ups have relatively 
low bargaining power vis-à-vis NFS as start-ups on average are small.  As NFS are not locked in 
yet at the moment of start-up, entrepreneurs cannot ignore NFS bargaining power.  Therefore, we 
conjecture that first-time business start-ups take the bargaining power of NFS into account when 
determining their initial capital structure.  Whereas financial data on privately held firms are not 
readily available in other countries, limited liability firms in Belgium (“corporations”) – except for 
financial institutions, insurance companies, foreign exchange brokers and hospitals – are legally 
required  to  file  their  annual  financial  statements  with  the  National  Bank  as  of  start-up.    This 
information is commercialized by Bureau Van Dijk Electronic Publishing by means of the Belfirst 
database. 
Our sample selection process involved different stages.  First, we used the PASO START 
database to select our sample of business start-ups.  This database contains survey information on a 
sample of 638 Belgian corporations established between October 2001 and September 2002 and 
employing between one and 49 persons.
6  These firms represent a 23.81% response rate in the 
population of start-ups that met the above criteria.  The survey itself consists of 91 questions, which 
meticulously polled entrepreneurs on their firm’s financial and ownership structure, their operations 
and  organization  and  their  strategic  choices  at  start-up.    While  some  questions  are  entirely 
quantitative in nature (e.g., the percentage of sales that are customer-specific, the percentage of 
unionized workers), other questions had to be answered on a five-point Likert-scale.  Entrepreneurs 
                                                 
6 www.paso.be   15 
were questioned shortly after start-up, such that there is no survival bias in this database.  Our study 
combines this unique survey information with the firm’s annual accounts in the Belfirst database. 
In the second stage of the sample selection process, we excluded all firms that were not 
entrepreneurial and first-time business start-ups.  This selection criterion removed the firms that 
were incorporations of a previously self-employed one-person business or firms that changed their 
corporation type.  Also, newly established subsidiaries of existing firms, split-ups, spin-offs, and 
other start-ups that are affiliated with existing firms were deleted from the sample.  These screening 
criteria reduced the sample from 638 to 223 true business start-ups, which have not yet built up any 
form of reputation in the input and output markets.  After deleting the firms with insufficient data to 
perform the multivariate analyses, our final sample includes information on 209 first-time business 
start-ups.
7  Figure 1 presents the industry distribution of these firms.  All firms are narrowly focused 
and report only one NACE code.  Likewise the population, a significant part of firms in our sample 
is active in trade and services.  This contrasts with most previous studies on newly established 
enterprises, which focus either on manufacturing start-ups (e.g., Huyghebaert and Van de Gucht, 
2006) or on high-tech ventures (e.g., Manigart and Struyf, 1997).  A notable exception is Cassar 
(2004), who looks at a sample of 292 Australian firms that are randomly drawn from the population 
of business start-ups during 1996–1998. 
<<Insert Figure 1>> 
Table 2 reports some descriptive statistics on firm size, asset structure and financial structure 
at the end of the start-up year.  The median firm employs three people in the start-up year and its 
total assets amount to €179,500.  69.14% of entrepreneurs invest only the minimum equity that is 
required by law in order to establish a corporation (not reported).  Since median total assets is less 
than median financing sources, more than half of sample firms incur accounting losses during the 
                                                 
7 For 14 firms, capital structure data were missing as these firms’ financial statements had not been entered into the 
Bureau Van Dijk database.  These firms are likely to have been liquidated before filing their first financial statements.  
Yet, in terms of NFS relationship costs, these firms are comparable to the ones that are included in the database.   16 
start-up  year.    Summary  statistics  on  asset  structure  reveal  that  tangible  fixed  assets  represent 
35.32% of total assets on average, whereas inventories and cash holdings represent 18.41% and 
14.48%,  respectively.    The  start-ups  in  our  sample  are  highly  leveraged,  as  outside  (i.e.,  non-
entrepreneurial) debt
8 on average equals 60.84% of total financing sources in the start-up year.  The 
median debt ratio even amounts to 68.30%.  We use total financing sources rather than total assets 
as the scaling variable because it abstracts from the earnings generated and retained during the first 
accounting year.  In our sample, on average 36.12% of debt is extended by banks and 23.90% by 
suppliers.  72.25% of firms use bank debt whereas 97.26% use trade credit in the start-up year.  
Other creditors mainly include the workforce and tax authorities.  Only 30.93% of debt outstanding 
matures after one year on average, which reflects the importance of current liabilities (including 
trade debt) for business start-ups.  For bank debt, this percentage amounts to 82.17%. 
<<Insert Table 2>> 
We extended the operating and financial information on the business start-ups discussed 
above with the annual accounts of all incumbent firms in the corresponding 179 five-digit NACE 
industries over the period 1996–2001, i.e. during the six years that precede the sampling year.  This 
additional database includes information on 35,528 firms.  As will be explained in the next section, 
data on recently established start-up firms will be used to calculate historical, exogenous industry-
level variables to measure some of the control variables. 
 
                                                 
8 Debt is defined as the sum of long-term debt and current liabilities.  Yet, loans extended by the entrepreneurs to their 
own firm are regarded as a source of (preferred) equity rather than debt financing, and thus these loans are not included 
in the debt ratio.  The reason is that entrepreneurs are unlikely to voluntarily file for bankruptcy when the debt-service 
payments  on  these  loans  can  no  longer  be  met  since.    Indeed,  unlike  the  USA,  Belgium  has  a  creditor-oriented 
bankruptcy law.  So, debtors have no incentive to seek protection under it.  Furthermore, most bankruptcy procedures in 
Belgium involve the firm’s liquidation.  Over the period 1998–2004, only 3.84% of bankruptcy procedures involved a 
reorganization of the distressed firm (Dewaelheyns, 2006).  On average, 16.20% of entrepreneurs lend money to their 
firm and these loans represent 17.09% of total debt in start-up accounts.   17 
4.  Variable Measurements and Methodology 
To  provide  conclusive  evidence  on  the  influence  of  NFS  relationship  costs on  a  firm’s  capital 
structure, we present different slices of evidence and perform various robustness checks, using a set 
of  closely  related  proxy  variables  for  the  concepts  of  interest.    One  particular  methodological 
challenge in this research field is to overcome the endogeneity problem between capital structure 
and product markets.  Arping and Lóránth (2006) discuss the example of Apple, which made its 
software more compatible with that of Microsoft when it became financially distressed.  In this 
way, customer liquidation costs could be reduced.  So, for mature firms, the size of NFS liquidation 
costs and – more generally – the firm’s operating strategy can be affected by its financial history.  
Similar arguments can be made regarding NFS bargaining power.  For instance, Hirsch (1991) 
suggests  that  firm  profitability  positively  affects  the  degree  of  labor  unionization.    In  their 
robustness checks, Kale and Shahrur (2006) take this potential endogeneity problem into account by 
lagging explanatory variables and by estimating a simultaneous equations model for leverage and 
customer/supplier R&D intensity, respectively.  This study takes a different approach by examining 
first-time business start-ups that decide on their initial financial structure before entering product 
markets. 
As all firms in our sample are private companies, we use book value measures to define the 
capital structure variables.  Starting from the first-year balance sheet, we re-calculate the initial 
financial structure as  closely  as possible to the moment of start-up by disregarding changes in 
equity  due  to  retained  earnings.    Also,  loans  extended  by  the  entrepreneurs  themselves  are 
considered to be equity rather than debt financing.  Leverage is then defined as the ratio of outside 
debt to total financing sources.  For the debt mix, we calculate the ratio of bank loans to total debt.  
Bank debt maturity is measured as the ratio of long-term bank debt (> 1 year) to total bank debt.
9 
                                                 
9 The financial statements only distinguish between short-term and long-term debt using a one-year dividing line.  
However, Barclay and Smith (1995), in their study of the debt maturity structure in listed US firms, find that results are 
qualitatively similar for one, two, three, four and five-year maturity dividing lines.   18 
The  test  variables,  NFS  liquidation  costs  and  NFS  bargaining  power,  are  difficult  to 
measure.  Furthermore, some proxy variables used in prior empirical work (e.g., R&D expenses) are 
not  generally  available  for  European  companies  due  to  some  minor  differences  in  financial 
reporting.  For the business start-ups in our sample, the information available in financial statements 
is further reduced as small firms are allowed to file abbreviated annual accounts.
10  However, Kale 
and Shahrur (2006) document that information that is typically not reported in the annual accounts 
may very well capture NFS relationship costs.  This study therefore combines financial statement 
information with a set of new proxy variables that are calculated from the PASO START survey 
database.  As the survey contains unique and detailed information on the start-up’s relationships 
with NFS and input and output market strategies, it is well suited to test our hypotheses.  Table 3 
provides  summary  statistics  on  the  survey  questions  that  are  relevant  for  this  study  on  NFS 
liquidation costs and bargaining power.  For a few questions, the response rate was less than 100% 
(see the last column of Table 3) and there we imputed the sample mean instead. 
<<Insert Table 3>> 
Each  of  the  questions  capturing  NFS  liquidation  costs  is  related  to  the  concept  of 
relationship-specific investments, but has a slightly different interpretation.  We hereby assume that 
when products/services are unique and production processes/technologies are new or advanced, all 
non-financial  stakeholders  (customers,  suppliers  and  employees)  have  to  make  firm-specific 
investments.  As the bargaining power of the various NFS is not necessarily highly related, we 
separately calculate measures for customer, supplier and employee bargaining power.
11  In order to 
                                                 
10 Firms are classified as large if they have either more than 100 employees or if they exceed at least two of the 
following three criteria: (a) more than 50 employees, (b) sales (excluding VAT) exceeding €7,300,000 and (c) total 
assets exceeding €3,650,000.  Only large firms are required to file detailed financial statements. 
11  Consistent  with  our  approach,  the  theoretical  literature  on  NFS  liquidation  costs  (e.g.,  Titman,  1984)  does  not 
distinguish between customers, suppliers or employees either.  Similarly, the contributions linking NFS bargaining 
power to capital structure always focus on one specific NFS category, e.g., employees in Bronars and Deere (1991) and 
input suppliers in Sarig (1998).   19 
effectively summarize the relevant information in the survey questions, we perform separate factor 
analyses on the set of questions measuring NFS liquidation costs, customer bargaining power and 
employee bargaining power, respectively.  Factor analysis is based on the idea that the correlations 
within a set of selected variables are due to some common underlying (and unobservable) forces.  
Hence, the underlying factors that best explain the correlations among variables are being extracted 
by means of this technique (see also Titman and Wessels, 1988).  For supplier bargaining power, 
we use a dummy variable that equals one when the firm buys its main inputs from only one supplier 
(“single sourcing”) and zero otherwise.  The latter variable is related to the measure used by Kale 
and Shahrur (2006), who proxy supplier bargaining power by the concentration ratio in supplier 
industries.  As a robustness check, we also discuss the correlation and OLS coefficients when using 
the individual survey questions to capture NFS relationship costs (see Section 5.5).  As expected, 
our measures of NFS liquidation costs and bargaining power are not highly related. 
The  results  of  the  factor  analyses  for  NFS  liquidation  costs,  customer  and  employee 
bargaining power are reported in Table 4.  We retain the factor with the highest eigenvalue from 
each analysis and investigate hereafter whether the sign of the factor loadings, which measure the 
contribution of a particular survey question to a certain factor, is consistent with the concept of 
interest.  Table 4 shows that firms scoring high on the NFS liquidation cost variable have unique 
products/services  that  are  difficult  to  copy.    These  firms  have  no  problems  differentiating 
themselves  from  their  competitors  and  strongly  emphasize  as  well  as  use  new  or  advanced 
processes and technologies.  Overall, these results convincingly support our conjecture that NFS 
have to make large relationship-specific investments and thus face high liquidation costs when the 
proxy for NFS liquidation costs is high. 
Firms  with  a  high  value  for  customer  bargaining  power  show  a  large  involvement  of 
customers  in  their  strategic  and  product  market  decisions.    These  firms  regularly  consult  their 
customers,  and  incorporate  information  on  customer  needs,  tastes  and  preferences  into  their 
operating  decisions.    Furthermore,  these  firms  pay  close  attention  to  changes  in  customer   20 
preferences and are very responsive to changes in customer needs.  Finally, firms that score high on 
the employee bargaining power measure have to deal with a unionized workforce that is highly 
involved in the firm’s day-to-day operations.
12 
<<Insert Table 4>> 
Finally,  we  select  control  variables  for  the  leverage,  debt  mix  and  maturity  structure 
equations from the existing literature.  Prior studies have found that the collateral value of assets, 
profitability,  growth  opportunities,  risk  and  firm  size  are  significant  determinants  of  capital 
structure.  For business start-ups, we expect that these variables will also be important as agency 
problems with creditors cannot be ignored, given these firms high default risk and large information 
asymmetries (see also Huyghebaert and Van de Gucht, 2006).  Since start-ups have no history, 
historical firm-level data are not available to calculate these control variables.  Furthermore, using 
data  on  asset  structure  from  the  start-up  year  could  result  in  serious  endogeneity  problems.  
Therefore, except for firm size, we decided to measure the control variables at the corresponding 
five-digit NACE industry level.  For this purpose, we use information on the population of business 
start-ups that started one year before our sample (i.e. October 2000 to October 2001).  Collateral 
value is measured as fixed assets to total assets.  Profitability is calculated by EBITDA to total 
assets.  Growth opportunities are proxied by the sales growth rate.  Risk is captured by the average 
percentage  of  start-up  firms  with  negative  cash  flows  in  the  industry;  here,  we  calculate  this 
                                                 
12 Employee involvement is considered to be a supplementary mechanism to union representation (see also Brewster et 
al., 2004).  Helper et al. (2002) describe the relation between employee involvement and employee bargaining power as 
follows: “Employee involvement can increase worker bargaining power by increasing workers’ feeling of solidarity 
due to increased interaction.  Involvement might also increase workers’ firm-specific knowledge, which can make it 
difficult to replace workers and makes firms rely upon senior workers to train new employees.  Involvement might also 
make it more difficult to monitor workers’ actions, so that high productivity increasingly relies on worker cooperation.  
Finally,  involvement  might  make  it  easier  for  employees  to  disrupt  the  production  process,  so  that  worker  non-
cooperation or other reactions to perceived unfairness is more costly to the firm.” 
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measure over 1996–2001 to improve its reliability.  We also have tested the robustness of our 
conclusions  by  including  industry  dummy  variables  in  addition  to  the  above  control  variables.  
Finally, firm size is measured by the log of total assets in the start-up year.  Table 5 summarizes the 
control  variables  and  presents  descriptive  statistics  and  their  expected  relation  with  the  capital 
structure variables. 
<<Insert Table 5>> 
To allow for a consistent comparison of the results, we decided to include all five above-
discussed control variables in all three regression equations.  Note that multicollinearity is not a 
problem in our study as variance inflation factors are all below five (Judge et al., 1988).  Some 
recent studies (e.g., Istaitieh and Rodriguez, 2003; Johnson, 2003; MacKay, 2003; Huyghebaert and 
Van  de  Gucht,  2006)  integrate  the  interdependencies  between  the  various  capital  structure 
components into their estimation framework by using a simultaneous equations methodology.  The 
conditions of such a model are very demanding, however.  Yet, MacKay (2003) and Huyghebaert 
and  Van  de  Gucht  (2006)  find  that  even  though  various  capital  structure  aspects  are  jointly 
determined, using an OLS model to estimate the impact of exogenous variables does not largely 
affect the results.  Hence, we use a cross-sectional OLS regression analysis to estimate the model 
and test the robustness of our conclusions after taking into account the interactions between various 
capital structure variables. 
 
5.  Empirical Results 
In this section, we look at how NFS liquidation costs (Section 5.1) and NFS bargaining power 
(Section  5.2)  affect  a  firm’s  initial  capital  structure.    Table  6  contains  the  results  from  these 
regression models.  Furthermore, we test whether these concepts also have a joint impact on capital 
structure, in Section 5.3.  The results of these models, where we thus include interaction terms 
between NFS liquidation costs and NFS bargaining power are presented in Table 7.  The control   22 
variables  are  discussed  in  Section  5.4.    Finally,  Section  5.5  provides  robustness  checks  and 
additional analyses. 
<<Insert Tables 6 and 7>> 
 
5.1.  NFS LIQUIDATION COSTS 
In line with earlier findings by Titman and Wessels (1988), Opler and Titman (1994) and Kale and 
Shahrur (2006) on listed firms, we find that first-time business start-ups also have significantly 
lower debt ratios when NFS liquidation costs are large (see Columns 1–3 of the leverage equation in 
Table 6).  This result confirms our first hypothesis that newly established entrepreneurial ventures 
choose a capital structure that lowers their probability of bankruptcy and thus liquidation when NFS 
face high liquidation costs, ceteris paribus.  As argued earlier, in a country with a creditor-oriented 
bankruptcy procedure, like Belgium, bankruptcy almost always ends in the firm’s liquidation rather 
than reorganization.  This result is not only statistically, but also economically significant.  A firm 
with  NFS  liquidation  costs  one  standard  deviation  higher  than  an  otherwise  identical  firm  has 
between  4.18%  and  4.64%  less  debt  outstanding.    Furthermore,  this  relation  is  robust  to  the 
exclusion of each individual survey question from the factor analysis for NFS liquidation costs, as 
reported in Table 4. 
We find a similar albeit somewhat weaker negative effect of NFS liquidation costs on the 
debt mix (see Columns 1–3 of the debt mix equation in Table 6).  A firm with NFS liquidation costs 
one standard deviation higher than an otherwise identical firm has between 3.05% and 3.75% less 
bank loans relative to total debt outstanding.  Again, this relation continues to hold after excluding 
variables one-by-one  from the NFS liquidation  cost factor  analysis.   Finally,  we do not  find a 
significant effect of NFS liquidation costs on bank debt maturity (see Columns 1–3 of the maturity 
structure equation in Table 6). 
Overall, these results indicate that in the case of first-time business start-ups limiting the 
debt ratio does not suffice to curb the negative impact of NFS liquidation costs on firm value.    23 
Indeed, and consistent with our arguments, these firms also take their debt composition into account 
when NFS are likely to face high liquidation costs.  Furthermore, the results suggest that once the 
fraction of bank loans has been limited, start-ups no longer (need to) adjust bank debt maturities to 
deal with NFS liquidation costs. 
 
5.2.  NFS BARGAINING POWER 
In this section, we test Hypothesis 2, i.e. start-up firms reduce their leverage and proportion of bank 
debt, and lengthen bank debt maturities to deal with more powerful non-financial stakeholders.  The 
discussion  is  divided  into  three  parts,  as  we  have  data  on  the  bargaining  power  of  customers, 
suppliers and employees, respectively. 
As for the customers, Column 1 of each capital structure equation in Table 6 provides the 
answers.  We find that customer bargaining power is significantly negatively related to the debt 
ratio and the proportion of bank loans in total debt.  A one standard deviation increase in customer 
bargaining power lowers the debt ratio by 3.14% and the proportion of bank loans by 4.95%.  This 
result is consistent with Sarig’s (1998) claim that firms reduce their probability of being liquidated 
when customers can threaten the firm’s survival.  However, the finding that customer bargaining 
power is significantly negatively related to bank debt maturity is not in line with Hypothesis 2. 
The  results  for  supplier  bargaining  power  are  presented  in  Column  2  of  each  equation.  
Again, we find that supplier bargaining power is significantly negatively related to the debt mix, 
consistent with Hypothesis 2.
13  A start-up firm that buys its inputs from a single supplier has 
13.30% less bank loans outstanding relative to total debt, ceteris paribus.  The results for employee 
bargaining power (reported in Column 3 of each capital structure equation) are not significant. 
                                                 
13 An alternative explanation for the negative relation between supplier bargaining power and debt mix might be that 
suppliers with strong bargaining power grant less trade credit.  However, we find no support for this conjecture as the 
correlation coefficient between supplier bargaining power and the number of days of supplier credit is insignificantly 
positive.   24 
In sum, whereas we never find a significant impact of employee bargaining power on initial 
capital structure, we do find that firms reduce the proportion of bank loans in total debt when 
customers and suppliers have strong bargaining power, ceteris paribus.  Also, when customers are 
in a strong bargaining position, business start-ups reduce their leverage.  These results are consistent 
with the idea that entrepreneurs worry about liquidation following default on their bank debt and 
hence, choose an appropriate debt mix in order to reduce the likelihood that suppliers of specialized 
factors of production suspend their supplies upfront.  Consistent with Section 5.1, the results again 
indicate that firms no longer (need to) adjust their bank debt maturities when the proportion of bank 
debt is limited. 
Our findings for the relation between employee bargaining power and capital structure are 
consistent with those of Fan et al. (2004).  These authors examine the effect of the level of statutory 
protection  offered  by  unions  and  find  no  impact  on  leverage.    Nevertheless,  Kale  and  Shahrur 
(2006) document a positive relation between supplier and customer concentration and leverage.  So, 
their results are consistent with the models of Bronars and Deere (1991), Dasgupta and Sengupta 
(1993) and Perotti and  Spier (1993).  However, Kale and Shahrur  examine listed firms, which 
already have established relationships with their NFS and thus may have incentives to change their 
capital structure ex post in order to reduce the amount of rents these NFS can extract from the firm.  
In contrast, our sample firms still have to convince NFS to enter into contracting relationships with 
the entrepreneur.  Furthermore, when firms are concerned about their liquidation, which is likely to 
hold more in the case of newly established entrepreneurial ventures when compared with listed 
firms, they may limit leverage to  curb NFS bargaining power.  Therefore, our findings do not 
contradict  those  of  Kale  and  Shahrur  (2006),  but  rather  illustrate  the  unique  context  of 
entrepreneurial ventures.  For entrepreneurs in first-time business start-ups, liquidation is a serious 
threat  and  firms  are  more  likely  than  not  to  worry  about  fierce  bank  liquidation  policies  (e.g., 
Franks and Sussman, 2005). 
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5.3.  INTERACTION BETWEEN LIQUIDATION COSTS AND BARGAINING POWER 
As an  additional test of the NFS liquidation cost theory, we conjecture that the effect of NFS 
liquidation costs on capital structure is strengthened when non-financial stakeholders are in a strong 
enough bargaining position to affect the firm’s profitability (Hypothesis 3).  In that case, NFS can 
be expected to pass on more easily their liquidation costs to the firm, ceteris paribus.  To investigate 
this idea, we include interaction terms between NFS liquidation costs and the different measures of 
customer, supplier and employee bargaining power in Table 7.  We find some limited support for 
our third hypothesis as the interaction term between NFS liquidation costs and supplier bargaining 
power is negative and significant in the leverage equation. 
The  interaction  terms  between  NFS  liquidation  costs  and  customer/employee  bargaining 
power are not significantly related to the capital structure variables.
14  An explanation could be that 
these  NFS  are  able  to  fully  charge  their  expected  liquidation  costs  when  they  enter  into  a 
relationship with the start-up firm, independent of their bargaining power.  As an example, firms 
usually provide guarantees and after-sales services for their products without additional charges, 
and  pay  for  the  job-related  training  of  employees.    Alternatively,  the  insignificance  of  the 
interaction term between NFS liquidation costs and employee bargaining power may be due to the 
fact that employee bargaining power was never significant in Table 6. 
 
5.4.  CONTROL VARIABLES 
The discussion of the control variables is based on the parameter estimates in Table 6.
15  First, we 
find that business start-ups in industries where assets have a higher collateral value have more bank 
debt outstanding.  From the supply side, banks may be wary of lending to first-time business start-
                                                 
14 The insignificance of NFS liquidation costs in Column 2 of the leverage and debt mix equations in Table 7 can be 
explained  by  its  relatively  high  correlation  coefficient  with  the  interaction  term  NFS  liquidation  costs  *  supplier 
bargaining power.  Yet, as the variance inflation factors are always below five, these regressions do not suffer from a 
multicollinearity problem (Judge et al., 1988).   26 
ups.  As these firms are surrounded by  high ex-ante failure risk and information asymmetries, 
adverse selection problems are likely to be an important consideration for banks.  Besides, moral 
hazard problems (such as risk shifting and underinvestment) may also be sizeable for these firms, 
especially when heading towards financial distress.  However, when assets have a high collateral 
value, banks are able to reduce their exposure to these problems by securing their loans.  We also 
find that the collateral value of assets is significantly positively related to bank debt maturity, which 
is  consistent  with  our  supply-driven  explanation  for  the  sign  of  this  variable  in  the  debt  mix 
equation.  An alternative (demand-driven) explanation for the maturity structure result may be that 
first-time entrepreneurs  fear banks will liquidate their firm prematurely following default when 
assets have a high collateral value (e.g., Hart, 1995; Manove et al., 2001).  Finally, the collateral 
value of assets is not significantly related to the debt ratio, which is at odds with the positive and 
significant relation found for mature listed firms (e.g., Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Wald, 1999).  
However, for business start-ups that do not have access to public debt markets, trade credit is an 
important component of the debt ratio. 
Firms operating in more profitable industries have a lower proportion of bank loans.  Yet, 
profitability  does  not  significantly  affect  bank  debt  maturity  structure  or  leverage.    Growth 
opportunities when measured at the industry level have no significant impact on initial financing 
decisions of business start-ups.  In line with earlier findings of Bradley et al. (1984) and Wald 
(1999), among others, we find that firms in risky industries raise significantly less debt financing.  
Our results for risk also indicate that banks abstain from lending to business start-ups in risky 
industries as the coefficient of risk is significantly negative in the debt mix equation.  Risk does not 
significantly affect the maturity structure of bank debt, suggesting that once the size of the bank 
loans has been limited there is no further need to reduce bank debt maturity.  These findings are 
robust to alternative definitions of risk, such as the industry failure rate and the variance of cash 
flows  within  the  corresponding  industry  during  1996–2001.    Overall,  these  results  stress  the 
                                                                                                                                                                  
15 Overall, the conclusions from the control variables continue to hold in Table 7.   27 
importance of risk as a determinant of initial capital structure in business start-ups.  Indeed, given 
these firms’ high default risk, potential agency problems with creditors cannot be ignored (see also 
Huyghebaert and Van de Gucht, 2006).  Overall, these results are robust when using the entire 
population of industry incumbents during 1996–2001 to measure the control variables. 
Finally, consistent with earlier research for mature listed firms (e.g., Titman and Wessels, 
1988;  Rajan  and  Zingales,  1995;  Wald,  1999;  Cassar,  2004),  larger  business  start-ups  have 
significantly more debt outstanding.  In the bankruptcy costs literature, this is explained by the 
negative relation between firm size and the probability of bankruptcy and by the notion that direct 
bankruptcy costs constitute a larger proportion of firm value for smaller firms.  Yet, start-ups with a 
larger need for external financing may have to raise their leverage when debt is the main source of 
external financing.  Additionally, we find that larger business start-ups have a larger proportion of 
bank loans, ceteris paribus. 
 
5.5.  ROBUSTNESS CHECKS AND ADDITIONAL ANALYSES 
In this section, we report the results from various robustness checks and additional analyses. 
First, we examine the robustness of our  results in Sections 5.1 and 5.2 when using the 
individual  survey  questions  to  measure  the  test  variables.    For  this  purpose,  we  present  the 
correlation coefficients and OLS parameter estimates of all individual survey variables used in the 
previous analyses.  The results for NFS liquidation costs and NFS bargaining power are reported in 
Tables 8 and 9, respectively.  The OLS coefficients in Tables 8 and 9 are obtained by replacing 
either NFS liquidation costs (Table 8) or NFS bargaining power (Table 9) by the corresponding 
survey variable.  We use the first capital structure equation from Table 6 to estimate the models (the 
results are largely similar when using the other two equations). 
<<Insert Tables 8 and 9>> 
The  correlation  coefficients  and  OLS  parameter  estimates  for  the  NFS  liquidation  cost 
variables (Table 8) largely confirm our earlier conclusions.  If products or services are more unique,   28 
difficult to copy and/or differentiated from those of competitors or if entrepreneurs emphasize or 
use new/advanced processes and technologies, these start-up firms will have a lower debt ratio, 
ceteris  paribus.    The  results  in  the  debt  mix  equation  show  that  the  explanatory  power  of  the 
individual survey questions is weaker, thereby demonstrating the power of factor analysis that pools 
the underlying common factor.  Yet, when products are differentiated from those of competitors or 
when  firms  emphasize/use  new/advanced  processes  and  technologies,  business  start-ups  have  a 
lower proportion of bank loans.  Consistent with our earlier conclusions in Tables 6 and 7, none of 
the individual survey variables is significantly related to the bank debt maturity structure. 
In Table 9, we look at the effects of the constituting survey questions in the factor analyses 
for  customer  and  employee  bargaining  power,  respectively.    For  the  variables  underlying  our 
customer bargaining power measure, we find that the more customers are involved in future product 
decisions, the lower is leverage and debt mix, ceteris paribus.  The proportion of bank loans in total 
debt outstanding is also lower when the management frequently discusses changes in consumers’ 
needs with employees and when the firm explicitly checks whether customers are satisfied with the 
quality of its products/services.  Finally, the maturity structure equation reveals that the negative 
coefficient  of  customer  bargaining  power  in  Tables  6  and  7  is  driven  by  the  survey  question 
examining future customer demands.  Overall, the results are strongest for the debt mix equation, 
which is consistent with our earlier findings in Tables 6 and 7. 
Table 9 also reports the effects of the individual survey questions underlying the factor 
analysis  for  employee  bargaining  power.    A  measure  for  employee  bargaining  power  that  has 
received a lot of attention in the literature is the degree of unionization (e.g., Bronars and Deere, 
1991).  Our dataset contains a similar measure, i.e. the percentage of employees who are members 
of a union.  Row 6 in Table 9 shows that the unionization rate does not affect a firm’s financing 
decisions, consistent with our earlier conclusions in Tables 6 and 7.  Finally, the level of employee 
involvement  does  not  significantly  affect  initial  capital  structure,  except  for  the  significantly 
positive parameter estimate in the debt mix equation.   29 
Next, we examined whether the results differ when using customer identity (individuals 
versus firms/governments) as a proxy for NFS liquidation costs.  Professional customers are likely 
to have higher relationship-specific investments (liquidation costs) as they use the start-up’s product 
or service as an intermediate input in their own production process.  In our sample, 32.88% of firms 
realize more than 25% of their sales from dealing with other corporations or the government.  In an 
unreported OLS regression analysis based on Table 7 but using customer identity to proxy for NFS 
liquidation  costs,  we  find  that  the  percentage  of  sales  to  professional  clients  is  significantly 
negatively  related  to  leverage  and  the  proportion  of  bank  debt  in  total  debt.    So,  these  results 
confirm earlier findings and conclusions. 
As we find that NFS relationship costs significantly affect both leverage and debt mix, and 
as these capital structure components are often jointly determined (e.g., Istaitieh and Rodriguez, 
2003; Johnson, 2003; MacKay, 2003; Huyghebaert and Van de Gucht, 2006), we also estimate a 
model  where  the  interactions  between  leverage  and  debt  mix  are  taken  into  account.    For  this 
purpose, we use an instrumental variable approach, to take into account the earlier-pointed out 
endogeneity of capital structure.  Hence, start-up leverage and debt mix are estimated as a function 
of  their  corresponding  industry-level  variables.    Yet,  this  approach  resulted  in  multicollinearity 
problems, making the capital structure components and control variables insignificant.  Hence, we 
re-estimated the model by instrumenting the residuals of a first-step regression that removes the 
effects  of  the  above  explanatory  variables  on  the  corresponding  industry-level  capital  structure 
components.  Table 10, which reports the results, shows that our conclusions are robust. 
<<Insert Table 10>> 
We also estimated the models in Tables 6 and 7 for the subsample of newly established 
firms that are not first-time entrepreneurial start-ups in the PASO START database (638 – 223 = 
415 firms are included in this database).  These companies represent new divisions of existing 
companies, split-ups of other firms and companies that changed their type of incorporation.  Hence, 
these firms have already built up a reputation in input and output markets and face smaller default   30 
risk (e.g., Dunne et al., 2005).  Overall, we find that NFS liquidation costs and NFS bargaining 
power are not significantly related to initial capital structure decisions in this sample (not reported). 
Finally,  split-sample  regressions  –  using  firm  size,  time  of  start-up  within  the  sampling 
period, and degree of competition within the industry – do not yield any significant differences. 
 
6.  Conclusions 
The empirical capital structure literature to date has not paid much attention as to how relationships 
with non-financial stakeholders (NFS) may affect financing decisions.  Yet, establishing long-term 
relationships  with  customers,  suppliers  and  employees  is  crucial  to  the  success  of  every  firm.  
Business  start-ups  and  their  entrepreneurs  lack  history  and  reputation  in  both  input  and  output 
markets.    Start-up  ventures  are  also  characterized  by  a  high  ex-ante  failure  risk.    Establishing 
relationships with newly established firms is therefore a high-risk venture for NFS, especially when 
they have to make large firm-specific investments that can be lost upon the firm’s liquidation.  
Titman  (1984),  among  others,  argues  that  as  capital  structure  controls  the  future  liquidation 
decision, firms with large NFS liquidation costs may limit their debt ratio.  Other theoretical papers 
show that firms tune their capital structure to the size of NFS bargaining power, either to reduce the 
surplus to be bargained on (e.g., Bronars and Deere, 1991; Dasgupta and Sengupta, 1993; Perotti 
and Spier, 1993) or to limit their vulnerability to strategic actions by NFS (e.g., Sarig, 1998).  This 
paper  provides  compelling  statistical  evidence  that  NFS  relationship  costs  are  a  significant 
determinant of initial financing decisions in newly established entrepreneurial ventures, thereby 
contributing to the literature on the interactions between product and financial markets. 
First, consistent with Titman (1984) and others, we find that the size of NFS liquidation 
costs is significantly negatively related to leverage and the proportion of bank loans in total debt 
outstanding.  Supplier bargaining power has an impact on the relation between NFS liquidation 
costs and capital structure, as start-ups reduce their reliance on bank loans when NFS liquidation 
costs are high especially when suppliers have large bargaining power.  By contrast, the interaction   31 
terms  between  NFS  liquidation  costs  and  customer/employee  bargaining  power  are  never 
significant.  Third, leverage is reduced when customer bargaining power is high whereas customer 
and supplier bargaining power also negatively affect a start-up’s reliance on bank debt.  These 
results  support  Sarig’s  (1998)  conjecture  that  entrepreneurs,  being  concerned  about  strict  bank 
liquidation  policies,  reduce  their  vulnerability  to  strategic  actions  from  NFS  by  adjusting  their 
capital structure. 
Arguably, our findings also have some public policy implications for governments and other 
institutions concerned with entrepreneurship.  They suggest that the availability of easy accessible 
outside equity financing could be an important impetus to entrepreneurship, especially in markets 
where relationships with NFS are important, but strenuous.  The reason is not so much to provide a 
buffer against first-year losses – as focused upon in the available literature to date – but rather to 
induce NFS to establish long-term relationships with newly founded ventures.  As the importance of 
relationships w, supply chain innovations, etc., we believe that the value added from incorporating 
these NFS relationship costs into capital structure decisions has grown over time and will continue 
to do so.  Overall, our results and conclusions may also be relevant in other situations where firms 
lack reputation and failure risk is important (e.g., entry into new markets). 
Finally, our empirical findings also indicate some avenues for further research.  Do start-ups 
that  pay  more  attention  to  NFS  liquidation  costs  and  NFS  bargaining  power  have  a  higher 
probability of being successful?  Survival analysis could provide an answer to such a question.  Are 
there other ways, besides adjusting capital structure, to decrease the impact of NFS relationship 
costs on firm value and survival?  In this respect, Arping and Lóránth (2006) show that firms can 
also mitigate NFS concerns about their long-term viability by reducing the very uniqueness of their 
products.  This result is important in the context of business start-ups, especially in traditional 
sectors, as debt financing usually is the only available source of outside financing.  Furthermore, 
our results suggest a role for trade credit to reduce customer concerns about liquidation.   32 
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Figure 1.  Industry distribution of first-time business start-ups 
 
This figure presents the industry distribution of our sample of 209 first-time business start-ups and compares this with 
the industry distribution of the population of Belgian firms and Belgian start-ups during the sampling period.  All 
sample firms are incorporated in Belgium and started their operations between October 2001 and October 2002.  The 
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Table 1.  Summary of the hypotheses 
1 2 3 4
1
* * *( * )
L
ij i i j i j i j j li lj
l
CS a a LC a BP a LC BP b X
=
= + + + +∑  
with:  ij CS = capital structure variable i (i=1: leverage; i=2: debt mix; i=3: maturity) of firm j 
j LC = proxy variable for NFS liquidation costs in firm j 
j BP  = proxy variable for NFS bargaining power in firm j 
lj X  = set of L control variables for capital structure variable i of firm j 
 
Hypotheses  Leverage (debt/total financing sources) 
The larger leverage, the higher the 
probability of liquidation. 
Debt mix (bank debt/total debt) 
The larger debt mix, the higher the 
probability of liquidation. 
Maturity (LT bank debt/total bank debt) 
The longer maturity, the lower the 
probability of liquidation. 
1. Liquidation costs 
“The higher NFS liquidation costs, the 
lower the probability of liquidation”  
[Titman, 1984] 
 
2 0 a <   2 0 a <   2 0 a >  
2. Bargaining power 
“The stronger NFS bargaining power is, 
the more firms will reduce their financial 
vulnerability”  [Sarig, 1998] 
 
3 0 a <   3 0 a <   3 0 a >  
3. Liquidation costs * Bargaining 
power 
“Liquidation costs affect capital 
structure to a larger extent if NFS have 
strong bargaining power” 
 
4 0 a <   4 0 a <   4 0 a >    39 
Table 2.  Characteristics of the start-up firms 
 
This table provides descriptive statistics for the sample of 209 first-time business start-ups that is constructed from the 
PASO START database.  All sample firms are incorporated in Belgium between October 2001 and October 2002.  The 
descriptive characteristics are based on the financial statements of the first available accounting year.  Total financing 
sources is the sum of outside (i.e. non-entrepreneurial) debt and entrepreneurial loans and equity.  Inside debt includes the 
loans that are extended by the entrepreneurs to their own firm.  The other variables are self-contained. 
 
  Mean  median  5
th pctl  95
th pctl  std. dev 
FIRM SIZE           
  Number of employees  5.9882  3  1  21  11.6471 
  Total assets (€)  488827  179500  32000  1592000  1177220 
  Total financing sources (€)  493293  184000  39000  1699000  1204680 
ASSET STRUCTURE           
  Tangible fixed assets/total assets  0.3532  0.3027  0.0200  0.8526  0.2643 
  Inventories/total assets  0.1841  0.1244  0.0068  0.5831  0.1846 
  Cash and marketable securities/total assets  0.1448  0.0966  0.0032  0.4560  0.1528 
FINANCIAL STRUCTURE           
  Leverage: outside debt/total financing sources  0.6084  0.6833  0.0914  0.9329  0.2690 
  Debt mix: bank debt/total debt  0.3612  0.3357  0  0.8801  0.3052 
  Trade credit/total debt  0.2390  0.1611  0.0049  0.6988  0.2459 
  Inside debt/total debt  0.1712  0.0526  0  0.6977  0.2426 
  LT debt (>1 year)/total debt  0.3093  0.2635  0  0.8554  0.3003 
  Maturity structure: LT bank debt (>1 
year)/bank debt 
0.8217  1  0  1  0.3271   40 
Table 3.  Characteristics of the proxy variables 
 
This table contains descriptive statistics on NFS liquidation costs and NFS bargaining power variables for the sample of 
209  first-time  business  start-ups.    All  variables  are  collected  from  the  PASO  START  database  and  represent  the 
relationship costs of customers (C), suppliers (S) and employees (E).  Block diagrams represent the frequency of answers 
to the questions that had to be answered on a five-item Likert scale.  This scale varies from completely disagree (at the left) 




Statement/Question  Responses (left: completely disagree, 
right: completely agree) 
N 
NFS Liquidation Costs 
C/S/E  Our products/services are unique 




C/S/E  It is difficult for our competitors to 
copy our products. 
 
209 
C/S/E  Our firm has no problems 




C/S/E  Our firm strongly emphasizes 












NFS Bargaining Power 
C  Management frequently discusses 




C  At least once a year we invite 
customers in order to find out 
which products/services they 
need in the future.   
209 
C  We pay little attention to changes 
in the preferences of our 
customers. 
 
209   41 
C  We have a tendency to neglect 




C  At least once a year we check 
whether customers are satisfied 
with the quality of our 
products/services.   
209 
S  Single sourcing: The firm has 
only one supplier for its main 
inputs. (0: no, 1: yes) 
40.89% of firms have only one supplier 
for their main inputs. 
203 
E  Percentage of employees within 
the firm who are members of a 
union. (left: 0, right 100%) 
 
173 
E  Employee involvement: How 
strong are employees’ decision 
powers and responsibilities? (left: 
very weak, right: very strong)    
209 
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Table 4.  Factor analysis for NFS liquidation costs and NFS bargaining power 
 
These  tables  report  the  results  of  the  factor  analyses  for  NFS  liquidation  costs,  customer  bargaining  power  and 
employee bargaining power, which are performed on the sets of variables that are described in Table 3.  The factor 
loading  of  a  variable  describes  the  relation  between  that  variable  and  the  underlying  (unobservable)  theoretical 
construct, i.e. factor.  Kaiser’s measure indicates the sampling adequacy for each factor (cut-off 0.5). 
 
Factor “Liquidation cost”  Factor loading  Kaiser’s measure 
Our products/services are unique in comparison to those of competitors.  0.7447  0.7213 
It is difficult for our competitors to copy our products.  0.6224  0.7254 
Our firm has no problems differentiating itself from its main competitors.  0.5548  0.7326 
Our firm strongly emphasizes new/advanced processes and technologies.  0.7213  0.5931 
Our firm uses new/advanced processes and technologies.  0.7244  0.5948 
% of firm goods/services that are customer-specific.  0.1982  0.7138 
Kaiser's measure of sampling adequacy: Overall MSA = 0.6548 
Number of factors with eigenvalue > 1: 2 
Eigenvalue factor “Liquidation costs” = 2.3340, eigenvalue factor 2 = 1.2478 
 
 
Factor “Customer bargaining power”  Factor loading  Kaiser’s measure 
Management frequently discusses changes in consumers’ needs with employees.  0.7484  0.6772 
At least once a year we invite customers in order to find out which 
products/services they need in the future. 
0.6958  0.6707 
We pay little attention to changes in the preferences of our customers.  -0.4822  0.6164 
We have a tendency to neglect important changes in our customers’ needs.  -0.2350  0.5283 
At least once a year we check whether customers are satisfied with the quality of 
our products/services. 
0.7275  0.6541 
Kaiser's measure of sampling adequacy: Overall MSA = 0.6493 
Number of factors with eigenvalue > 1: 2 
eigenvalue factor “Customer bargaining power” = 1.8611, eigenvalue factor 2 = 1.1791 
 
 
Factor “Employee bargaining power”  Factor loading  Kaiser’s measure 
Percentage of employees who are members of a union. (missing values imputed 
with mean value)  0.5400  0.5465 
Employee involvement: How strong are employees’ decision powers and 
responsibilities?  0.6261  0.5295 
Kaiser's measure of sampling adequacy: Overall MSA = 0.5290 
Number of factors with eigenvalue > 1: 1 
eigenvalue factor “Employee bargaining power” = 1.2040 
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Table 5.  Description of the control variables used in the estimations of the financial structure determinants 
 
This table describes the control variables that are used in the estimations of the initial capital structure variables of first-time business start-ups.  The sample of start-up firms is 
described in Table 3.  Except for firm size, these control variables are measured at the five-digit NACE industry level.  This data was obtained from the Belfirst database. 
 
Variable name   Description  Mean  median  std.dev  Lev  Mix  Mat 
Collateral value  Industry mean of tangible fixed assets to total assets for all start-up firms (between 
10/2000 and 10/2001) in the corresponding industry. 
0.3784  0.3720  0.1331  +  +  + 
Profitability  Industry mean of EBITDA to total assets for all start-up firms (between 10/2000 and 
10/2001) in the corresponding industry. 
0.0646  0.0585  0.0779  −  +/−  + 
Growth Opportunities  Industry mean of sales growth during the first start-up year for all start-up firms 
(between 10/2000 and 10/2001) in the corresponding industry. 
0.3167  0.1691  0.7405  −  +/−  − 
Risk  The percentage of start-up firms with a negative cash flow during the first start-up 
year for all start-up firms in 1996–2001 in the corresponding industry 
0.2032  0.2043  0.0857  −  −  +/− 
Firm size  Logarithm of total assets in the start-up year  5.2076  5.0173  1.2936  +   +  +   44 
Table 6.  The determinants of leverage, debt mix and bank debt maturity structure for start-up firms: The base model 
 
This table presents the OLS regression estimates of the determinants of (1) leverage, (2) the debt mix, and (3) the maturity structure of bank debt in the start-up year for 209 first-time 
business start-ups.  Leverage is the ratio of outside debt to total assets.  Debt mix is the ratio of bank debt to total debt.  Maturity structure is the ratio of long-term bank debt to total 




proportion of total funds that 
is (outside) debt financing 
Debt mix 
proportion of debt financing 
that is bank debt 
Maturity structure 
proportion of bank debt 
that is long-term debt 
Intercept  0.4061  0.4039  0.3940  0.1044  0.0887  0.0931  0.6018  0.5889  0.6046 
  (0.0006)  (0.0012)  (0.0009)  (0.4522)  (0.5412)  (0.5087)  (0.0045)  (0.0078)  (0.0046) 
NFS liquidation costs  -0.0306  -0.0366  -0.0361  -0.0259  -0.0320  -0.0352  0.0489  0.0296  0.0358 
  (0.0837)  (0.0426)  (0.0387)  (0.1324)  (0.0812)  (0.0942)  (0.1361)  (0.3669)  (0.2689) 
Customer bargaining power  -0.0317      -0.0500      -0.0636     
  (0.0739)      (0.0186)      (0.0522)     
Supplier bargaining power    -0.0626      -0.1330      0.0320   
    (0.2701)      (0.0481)      (0.8016)   
Employee bargaining power      0.0190      0.0052      0.0411 
      (0.2416)      (0.7911)      (0.1596) 
Collateral value  -0.0015  0.0207  0.0252  0.5520  0.5839  0.5994  0.6761  0.8158  0.7235 
  (0.9917)  (0.8916)  (0.8624)  (0.0017)  (0.0013)  (0.0007)  (0.0086)  (0.0026)  (0.0050) 
Profitability  -0.0037  -0.0040  -0.0038  -0.0074  -0.0071  -0.0078  -0.0034  -0.0031  -0.0036 
  (0.1750)  (0.1465)  (0.1580)  (0.0219)  (0.0307)  (0.0167)  (0.4860)  (0.5339)  (0.4539) 
Growth opportunities  -0.0167  -0.0169  -0.0208  -0.0313  -0.0283  -0.0352  -0.0282  -0.0222  -0.0292 
  (0.4927)  (0.4961)  (0.3956)  (0.2824)  (0.3367)  (0.2330)  (0.5637)  (0.6548)  (0.5525) 
Risk  -0.4650  -0.5135  -0.5007  -0.7379  -0.7427  -0.7722  0.1393  0.0064  0.0555 
  (0.0314)  (0.0227)  (0.0213)  (0.0044)  (0.0054)  (0.0033)  (0.6996)  (0.9866)  (0.8794) 
Firm size  0.0677  0.0677  0.0684  0.0488  0.0472  0.0466  -0.0159  -0.0223  -0.0184 
  (<0.0001)  (<0.0001)  (<0.0001)  (0.0022)  (0.0036)  (0.0043)  (0.5227)  (0.3778)  (0.4615) 
Adjusted R²  15.27%  14.56%  14.47%  20.62%  19.04%  18.35%  8.63%  6.55%  7.44% 
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Table 7.  The determinants of leverage, debt mix and bank debt maturity structure for start-up firms: Models with interaction terms 
 
This table presents the OLS regression estimates of the determinants of (1) leverage, (2) the debt mix, and (3) the maturity structure of bank debt in the start-up year for 209 first-time 
business start-ups.  Leverage is the ratio of outside debt to total assets.  Debt mix is the ratio of bank debt to total debt.  Maturity structure is the ratio of long-term bank debt to total 
bank debt.  The explanatory variables are described in Table 4 whereas the control variables are defined in Table 5.  p-values are reported between parentheses. 
 
  Leverage  Debt mix  Maturity structure 
Intercept  0.4072  0.4123  0.3884  0.10343  0.0884  0.0988  0.5971  0.5500  0.6010 
  (0.0006)  (0.0009)  (0.0011)  (0.4577)  (0.5436)  (0.4856)  (0.0050)  (0.0131)  (0.0046) 
NFS liquidation costs  -0.0321  -0.0241  -0.0355  -0.0245  -0.0323  -0.0358  0.0527  0.0180  0.0321 
  (0.0826)  (0.2044)  (0.0430)  (0.1044)  (0.1654)  (0.0897)  (0.1239)  (0.5922)  (0.3203) 
Customer bargaining power  -0.0320      -0.0497      -0.0631     
  (0.0723)      (0.0198)      (0.0548)     
Supplier bargaining power    -0.0434      -0.1335      0.0378   
    (0.4478)      (0.0514)      (0.7657)   
Employee bargaining power      0.0173      0.0069      0.03931 
      (0.2957)      (0.7287)      (0.1758) 
NFS liquidation costs * Customer BP  0.0044      -0.0040      -0.0124     
  (0.7739)      (0.8236)      (0.6872)     
NFS liquidation costs * Supplier BP    -0.1061      0.0030      0.2269   
    (0.0594)      (0.9644)      (0.1555)   
NFS liquidation costs * Employee BP      0.0090      -0.0090      0.0475 
      (0.5695)      (0.6343)      (0.1045) 
Collateral value  -0.0037  0.0490  0.0251  0.5541  0.5831  0.5995  0.6824  0.7963  0.7015 
  (0.9797)  (0.7470)  (0.8631)  (0.0017)  (0.0015)  (0.0007)  (0.0083)  (0.0032)  (0.0063) 
Profitability  -0.0037  -0.0039  -0.0040  -0.0074  -0.0071  -0.0078  -0.0034  -0.0025  -0.0045 
  (0.1711)  (0.1627)  (0.1523)  (0.0234)  (0.0312)  (0.0180)  (0.4831)  (0.6251)  (0.3534) 
Growth opportunities  -0.0172  -0.0189  -0.0202  -0.0308  -0.0282  -0.03585  -0.0266  -0.0195  -0.0282 
  (0.4831)  (0.4461)  (0.4113)  (0.2910)  (0.3393)  (0.2262)  (0.5876)  (0.6931)  (0.5630) 
Risk  -0.4640  -0.5040  -0.4858  -0.7389  -0.7430  -0.7872  0.1425  -0.0080  0.0785 
  (0.0322)  (0.0244)  (0.0268)  (0.0044)  (0.0056)  (0.0030)  (0.6939)  (0.9831)  (0.8292) 
Firm size  0.0675  0.0634  0.0690  0.0489  0.0473  0.0460  -0.0152  -0.0139  -0.0163 
  (<0.0001)  (<0.0001)  (<0.0001)  (0.0022)  (0.0041)  (0.0050)  (0.5433)  (0.5904)  (0.5122) 
Adjusted R²  14.87%  15.72%  14.17%  20.23%  18.61%  18.02%  8.08%  7.27%  8.54% 
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Table 8.  The determinants of leverage, debt mix and bank debt maturity structure for start-up firms: NFS liquidation costs 
 
This table presents the correlation coefficients and OLS parameter estimates of the determinants of (1) leverage, (2) the debt mix, and (3) the maturity structure of bank debt in the 
start-up year for 209 first-time business start-ups.  Leverage is the ratio of outside debt to total financing sources.  Debt mix is the ratio of bank debt to total debt.  Maturity structure is 
the ratio of long-term bank debt to total bank debt.  Except for the NFS liquidation cost variable, we use the same set of explanatory and control variables as in Table 6 and as defined 
in Tables 4 and 5.  We use the Pearson test for OLS parameter estimates and the t-test for OLS parameter estimates.  p-values are reported between parentheses. 
 
NFS LIQUIDATION COSTS  Leverage  Debt mix  Maturity structure 
Correlation  OLS  Correlation  OLS  Correlation  OLS 
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Table 9.  The determinants of leverage, debt mix and bank debt maturity structure for start-up firms: NFS bargaining power 
 
This table presents the correlation coefficients and OLS parameter estimates of the determinants of (1) leverage, (2) the debt mix, and (3) the maturity structure of bank debt in the 
start-up year for 209 first-time business start-ups.  Leverage is the ratio of outside debt to total financing sources.  Debt mix is the ratio of bank debt to total debt.  Maturity structure is 
the ratio of long-term bank debt to total bank debt.  Except for the NFS bargaining power variable, we use the same set of explanatory and control variables as in Table 6 and as defined 
in Tables 4 and 5.  We use the Pearson test for OLS parameter estimates and the t-test for OLS parameter estimates.  p-values are reported between parentheses. 
 
NFS BARGAINING POWER  Leverage  Debt mix  Maturity structure 
  Correlation  OLS  Correlation  OLS  Correlation  OLS 














At least once a year we invite clients to find out which 









































At least once a year we check whether customers are satisfied 

























Employee involvement: How strong are employees’ decision 
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Table 10.  The determinants of leverage and debt mix: Results of a simultaneous equations model with interaction terms 
This table presents the OLS regression results of the determinants of leverage and the debt mix in the start-up year for 209 first-time business start-ups.  Leverage is the ratio of outside 
debt to total assets.  Debt mix is the ratio of bank debt to total debt. The explanatory variables leverage and debt mix are the results of a regression on the control variables and are 
instrumented on industry leverage and industry debt mix, respectively. Other explanatory variables are described in Table 4 whereas the control variables are defined in Table 5.  p-
values are reported between parentheses. 
 
   Leverage  Debt mix 
0.3685  0.3695  0.3612  0.3699  0.3655  0.3573  0.1029  0.1018  0.0924  0.0920  0.0934  0.0990  Intercept 
(0.0033)  (0.0033)  (0.0065)  (0.0053)  (0.0037)  (0.0049)  (0.4602)  (0.4665)  (0.5266)  (0.5294)  (0.5093)  (0.4865) 
-0.0361  -0.0368  -0.0427  -0.0316  -0.0416  -0.0409  -0.0262  -0.0248  -0.0312  -0.0318  -0.0351  -0.0358  NFS liquidation costs 
(0.0408)  (0.0464)  (0.0178)  (0.0957)  (0.0175)  (0.0196)  (0.2150)  (0.2618)  (0.1458)  (0.1632)  (0.0970)  (0.0923) 
-0.0331  -0.0332          -0.0508  -0.0505          Customer bargaining power 
(0.0661)  (0.0662)          (0.0182)  (0.0193)         
    -0.0599  -0.0420          -0.1368  -0.1379      Supplier bargaining power 
    (0.2940)  (0.4666)          (0.0453)  (0.0483)     
        0.0187  0.0168          0.0051  0.0068  Employee bargaining power 
        (0.2535)  (0.3130)          (0.7979)  (0.7355) 
   0.0020                -0.0043           NFS liquidation costs * Customer bargaining power 
   (0.8991)                (0.8116)          
      -0.0979              0.0056       NFS liquidation costs * Supplier bargaining power 
      (0.0830)              (0.9341)      
           0.0097            -0.0090  NFS liquidation costs * Employee bargaining power 
           (0.5408)            (0.6355) 
0.0855  0.0829  0.1114  0.1350  0.0867  0.0920  0.5552  0.5576  0.5765  0.5748  0.5989  0.5991  Collateral value 
(0.6520)  (0.6647)  (0.5775)  (0.4984)  (0.6516)  (0.6303)  (0.0017)  (0.0017)  (0.0017)  (0.0019)  (0.0008)  (0.0008) 
-0.0044  -0.0045  -0.0048  -0.0046  -0.0045  -0.0046  -0.0078  -0.0078  -0.0066  -0.0066  -0.0078  -0.0077  Profitability 
(0.1090)  (0.1090)  (0.0926)  (0.1016)  (0.1073)  (0.1010)  (0.0290)  (0.0300)  (0.0686)  (0.0696)  (0.0314)  (0.0330) 
-0.0176  -0.0177  -0.0177  -0.0193  -0.0212  -0.0206  -0.0319  -0.0315  -0.0274  -0.0272  -0.0351  -0.0358  Growth opportunities 
(0.4755)  (0.4731)  (0.4824)  (0.4406)  (0.3936)  (0.4072)  (0.2758)  (0.2840)  (0.3552)  (0.3592)  (0.2379)  (0.2307) 
-0.5103  -0.5089  -0.5608  -0.5504  -0.5314  -0.5186  -0.7222  -0.7224  -0.7632  -0.7642  -0.7741  -0.7887  Risk 
(0.0248)  (0.0257)  (0.0185)  (0.0201)  (0.0204)  (0.0244)  (0.0067)  (0.0068)  (0.0054)  (0.0055)  (0.0041)  (0.0038) 
0.0711  0.0710  0.0714  0.0675  0.0711  0.0718  0.0488  0.0489  0.0472  0.0474  0.0465  0.0460  Firm size 
   (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (0.0023)  (0.0023)  (0.0036)  (0.0041)  (0.0045)  (0.0051) 
                  -0.2790  -0.2946  0.3791  0.3890  0.0359  0.0287  Leverage 
                  (0.7964)  (0.7861)  (0.7289)  (0.7244)  (0.9740)  (0.9792) 
-0.5374  -0.5271  -0.5396  -0.5229  -0.3680  -0.4053                    Debt mix 
(0.4775)  (0.4896)  (0.4956)  (0.5068)  (0.6259)  (0.5931)                   
Adjusted R²  16.16%  19.48%  15.46%  16.36%  15.25%  14.98%  20.24%  19.85%  18.86%  18.23%  17.92%  17.59% 
 